Specification and Security-Analysis of an Application using the SHVT Tutorial

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1 Introduction

Objectives of this tutorial:

- Introduction to the specification of an application using inheritance mechanism for roles and transition patterns.
- Explanation of mechanisms for specification refinement.
- Step-by-step tutorial for analysis of a simple example protocol.

This tutorial requires the SHVT and the project and preamble files for the example.

Additional information: SHVT Tutorial, SHVT-Handbook (online help)

Scenario:
A simple application where a client requests secret data from a server is specified. The tutorial comprises the following steps:

1. Specification of the application and security goals using basic definitions for the network layer.

2. Implementation of an attacker who tries to get secret information.

3. Adapting the model to the real environment of the application (WIFI, Intranet, SSL, usage of certificates) and specification of the security mechanisms used to ensure the security requirements defined in step 1.

\[1\text{contact shvt@sit.fraunhofer.de for more information}\]
4. After the protocol refinement it is checked whether the security goals are achieved.

2 Specification of the Application

2.1 First Specification using transition patterns

The Standard preambles with data types (sets.vsp) and functions (functions.vsp) are available for specification of cryptographic protocols. In this tutorial we assume that these standard definitions are used. In this case, the protocol specification consists of three parts:

- Part 1
  Declaration of roles
  Initial state of state components

- Part 2
  Transition patterns specify protocol steps

- Part 3
  Binding of roles with agents’ names

2.2 Roles and initial state

Role notion supports specification of actions for subjects acting in a certain role. All actions (elementary automaton) executed in a certain role are assigned to this role in the definition of an transition pattern. Also state components can be assigned to a certain role. This can be compared with class definitions of programming languages. Local state components correspond to local class variables and transition pattern to methods of this class. Differently to class definitions in programming languages the instantiation of roles has to be defined statically in the preamble file. No dynamic creation of roles is possible. In programming languages these mechanisms are used to encapsulate functionality and data. For state transition pattern access to local state components is not encapsulated. Access to local state components by transition pattern, not assigned to the corresponding role, can be modeled. So there are no restrictions when attack models have to be specified.

For every instantiation the corresponding elementary automaton and the state components will be generated from the definitions of transition pattern and state pattern assigned to this role. It is possible to refine the behavior of a transition pattern depending on varying instantiations of the role.
Two roles are defined: Client and Server. The command `def_role` is used for declaration of roles.

Listing 1: Definition of roles

```plaintext
def_role Client from Network
{  secret : Messages_seq := ::,
    state : Messages := 'start',
    server : Agents_seq := Server };

def_role Server from Network
{  secret : Messages_seq := ['secret'],
    state : Messages := 'init' };
```

For each role we specify two local state components `state`, and `secret`. The initial values of these state components are also specified in the role declaration. Client knows the identifiers of all agents acting as a server, in order to be able to start protocol runs with these agents. The servers are stored in the local state component `server` (the name `Client_server` has to be used for this state component in transition patterns). Role names in initial states and transition patterns are automatically replaced with actual agents’ names during the generation of analysis scenarios. The used inheritance mechanism (`from Network`) will be explained in 2.5.

2.3 Transition pattern

Protocol steps are specified by transition patterns. Each pattern specifies one single step. The patterns specify conditions for state transitions and changes of the states of state components of the particular agent and of shared state components (e.g. `Network`). All other state components remain unchanged.

Syntax:
```plaintext
def_trans_pattern role_a pattern_label
(x1,x2,x3,...,xn)
allocations,
predicates,
actions;
```

This generates a transition pattern `pattern_label` and assigns it to a role `role_a`.

The next line declares local variables. These variables are local to the transition pattern. The rest of the pattern contains allocations, predicates and actions on state components (adding or removing elements). A state transition can occur in a particular state, if in this state an interpretation of the local variables exists.
such that all allocations are defined, all predicates true and all actions result in a valid subsequent states in accordance with the domains of state components.

2.4 Some important operators

Table 1 shows the most important operators to be used in transition patterns. $A_{State}$ denotes a state component, $c$ a constant value and $mset$ a multiset. $x_u$ is a previously unbound variable and $x_b$ is already bound by a previous line in the pattern. Apart from the operation given here, other operators can be used as described in the SHVT handbook, section on preambles.
### Table of important operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>operator</th>
<th>example</th>
<th>description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;&lt;</td>
<td>$x_u &lt;&lt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>$x_u$ is allocated with one element of $\text{A_State}$ (non-deterministic) and deleted in $\text{A_State}$. If $\text{A_State}$ is empty, no operation will occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_b &lt;&lt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>If $x_b \in \text{A_State}$, $x_b$ is deleted in $\text{A_State}$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c &lt;&lt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>If $c \in \text{A_State}$, $c$ is deleted in $\text{A_State}$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{mset} &lt;&lt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>If $\text{mset} \subseteq \text{A_State}$, this subset is deleted in $\text{A_State}$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;&gt;</td>
<td>$x_b &gt;&gt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>$x_b$ is inserted in $\text{A_State}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{mset} &gt;&gt; \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>$\text{mset}$ is inserted in $\text{A_State}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c &gt;&gt; \text{A_state}$</td>
<td>$c$ is inserted in $\text{A_State}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>$x_u ? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>$x_u$ is allocated with one element of $\text{A_State}$ (non-deterministic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_b ? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>if $x_b \in \text{A_State}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c ? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>if $c \in \text{A_State}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_u ? \text{mset}$</td>
<td>$x_u$ is allocated with one element of $\text{mset}$ (non-deterministic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_b ? \text{mset}$</td>
<td>if $x_b \in \text{mset}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c ? \text{mset}$</td>
<td>if $c \in \text{mset}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~?</td>
<td>$x_u \sim? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>predicate is false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_b \sim? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>if not $x_b \in \text{A_State}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c \sim? \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>if not $c \in \text{A_State}$, this boolean term is true, otherwise it’s false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:=</td>
<td>$x_u := \text{term}$</td>
<td>$x_u$ is allocated with $\text{term}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x_u := \text{A_State}$</td>
<td>$x_u$ is allocated with the sequence stored in state $\text{A_State}$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{A_State} := \text{term}$</td>
<td>$\text{A_State}$ is allocated with the value of $\text{term}$ converted to a multiset.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Table of important operators

### 2.5 Abstract Roles

Abstract roles are roles for which no instantiation of state components and transition pattern is performed. Other roles can inherit these roles. Transition pattern and state components of the abstract role are instantiated for these pattern if they are not also declared as abstract roles.

The roles Client and the Server inherit possible state components, transition
pattern and macros from the abstract role Network. No state components are inherited from Network.

The shared state component Network, used by the abstract role Network, is empty in the initial state:

\[
\text{def_state Network: net_elem_seq := ::, Network_send, Network_rec;}
\]

For integration of attackers, Network can be split into two state components Network\_send and Network\_rec. The command “Split” in the context menu of the preamble definition is used to activate split of state components. The abstract role Network also inherits an abstract role (Basic):

Listing 2: Basic network access

```
def_role Basic abstract
{
  send (to,m,net)
    (Basic,to,m) >> net 
}
def_role Network abstract from Basic
{
  send (to,m)
    send(to,m,Network)
  relay(from,to,m)
    relay(from,to,m,Network)
  receive (from,m)
    receive(from,m,Network) 
  listen (from,to,m)
    listen(from,to,m,Network) 
}
```

No local state components are declared for the roles Basic and Network (after the \text{def_role ... } line). The role Basic provides four macros for accessing state component representing the network interface:

\text{send, receive, relay, listen}

The abstract role Network also provides these four macros. In this case the name of the state component representing the network interface is not used as a parameter. In all cases the state component Network is used. So it is possible to use the same mechanisms for different network parts by declaring different roles (e.g. DMZ, Intranet etc.). It’s not possible to use one of the four macros defined by the role Basic directly in transition pattern whose roles’ inherit from Network.
The first macro found in the inheritance hierarchy is used. Initial values of state components of sup roles with equal names are overwritten. The inheritance hierarchy for the roles Client and Server defined in section 2.2 looks as follows:

Client
| Network
| Basic

Server
| Network
| Basic

2.6 Simple Example

Using the macros defined with the abstract role Network our simple Example can be specified by the following transition pattern:

Listing 3: Application

def trans_pattern Client send_get_secret
()
    Client_state = 'start',
    Client_state := 'wait',
    send(Client_server,['get_secret']) ;

def trans_pattern Client rec_secret
(secret)
    Client_state = 'wait',
    Client_state := 'start',
    receive(Client_server,['data',secret]),
    when variable_bound(secret) = 'true' {
        (Client,conf,[secret]) >> Goals }

def trans_pattern Server cmd_get_secret
(from,m)
    listen(from,'Server',m),
    head(m)='get_secret',
    secret ? secret ,
    send(from,['data',secret]),
    (Server,conf,[secret]) >> Goals ;

Several agents could be assigned to the role Client and the role Server using the construct def_pattern_bind. In our example we only will use the default binding where the name of the agent is equal to the role name.

This example can be found in the demo directory of the SHVT. In order to load the example and to edit the specification the following steps have to be carried out using the SHVT:

1. start SHVT
• The tool is started using the start script sshvt in the installation directory.

2. load project

• In the SHVT main menu start the Project Manager.

• In the project manager window use File>Open to load the project file. The file is called ExampleApplication.prj and is in the subdirectory ExampleApplication.

• The project is shown as a tree. There are four group nodes Standard-Preambles, Network, Basic_Example, and Extended_Example. The sub-tree StandardPreambles contains nodes for standard preamble definitions (data types and functions). To open our example click middle mouse on Basic_Example.pre in group Basic_Example.

The group Network comprises all definitions related to network access and network structure. The already mentioned role Network, used for basic specification of network access, is also included in this group. Two variants of the example application are included in the project tree. Basic_Example includes the preamble implementing the application described in this section. Since macros of the abstract role Network are used in the transition pattern of Basic_Example.pre it will be necessary to perform a macro expansion for these transition patterns to interpret analysis results. For expansion of the transition pattern Client send get_secret use the command Misc > Expand Transition Pattern in the preamble editor menu bar and select this pattern.

Listing 4: Macro expansion

```plaintext
def_trans_pattern Client send get_secret
()   
   Client.state='start',
   Client.state := 'wait',
   (Client,Client,server,['get_secret']) >> Network.send;
```

Here the macro call receive(Client,server,['data',secret]) is expanded to (Client,Client,server,['get_secret']) >> Network_send. If more complex inheritance mechanisms and macros are used it is essential for interpretation of analysis results to check macro expansion.

Now we can check our model by computing the reachability graph (graph of all states with the corresponding transitions). Execute the command Analysis in the context menu of group Basic_Example and click on the command Start Exhaustive Analysis in the right pane of the analysis window which is opened.

\(^2\) only the transition pattern with a name beginning with token at the current cursor position are listed
Analysis
Start: 25.1.2008 12:43:07
Stop: 25.1.2008 12:43:07

Reachability Graph SerEx (5)

3 States computed.
(1 DeadState)
(0 Pseudo State Transitions)
(3 State Transitions)

The reachability graph can be drawn using the command Draw Graph in the context menu of Reachability Graph SerEx (5):

Only three state state transitions occur. The initial state $M-1$ can by displayed by clicking (clicking mouse-l on compile) Reachability Graph SerEx (5), the last state $M-4$ with no successor state can be displayed by clicking mouse-l on (1 DeadState):

$M-1$
Client_send_get_secret $M-2$
Client_secret: $<::>$
Client_server: $<Server>$
Client_state: $<start>$
Goals: $<::>$
Network: $<::>$
Server_secret: $<[secret]>$
Server_state: $<init>$

$M-3$ Client_rec_secret
$M-4+$
+++ dead +++

Client_secret: $<[secret]>$
Client_server: $<Server>$
Client_state: $<wait>$
Goals: $<\{Client,conf,[secret]\}.\{Server,conf,[secret]\}>$
Network: $<::>$
Server_secret: $<[secret]>$
Server_state: $<init>$

In the last state the client did store the secret received from the server on Client_secret. The state component Goals has the value $<\{Client,conf,[secret]\}.\{Server,conf,[secret]\}>$. This state component is used to model certain security requirements. In our case the value 'secret' has to be confidential and only client and server should have access to this data. Goal is
set in the related protocol steps. The real implementation of the protocol will not include these statements. They are used for analysis purposes only. Because only the agents Client and Server exist in our model analysis of the security requirements is useless. In the next step a possible attacker is added to the model. This attacker is sniffing the network traffic. Despite the fact that it’s clear that the attacker will be successful (no security mechanisms are used) it makes sense to check whether the attacks will be found before adding the necessary security mechanisms to the model, to avoid errors in the attacker model.

**Analysis with attacker and automatic search for successful attacks.**
To activate the attacker the following steps have to be executed:

- In the project manager choose **Options** in the menu for **Basic.pre** in group **Network**. Activate Split by choosing **Yes**.

- Activate compile (click for **attacker_functions.pre** in group **Standard_Preambles** (left mouse click) and **Attacker_sniff_Network.pre** in group **Basic_Example**. This attacker sniffs the network and tries to decode messages using all data available for him. Also generic attacker models where the attacker also tries to manipulate the protocol are available, but not used in this tutorial.

- Choose **Set Break** in the Analysis window (in the menu on the right side). A break condition has been saved with the project. This condition is automatically loaded. This break condition stops the computation of the reachability graph as soon as the attacker has access to data marked as confidential in the state component **Goals**. Activate the break condition by clicking **Set Break**.

- Start the computation of the reachability graph by clicking **Start Exhaustive Analysis** in the command pane on the right side.

- The computation stops and a state is shown in the output pane. In this state the attacker has sniffed the confidential secret from **Network_send** and would put the sniffed message to **Network_receive** if the analysis is continued.

- Choose **Compute one Way to Root** in the object menu for M-6 (while doing this, a frame is drawn around the complete state. The tool automatically computes one possible path to the initial state. This path shows which steps lead to the successful attack. This path can be explored and displayed step by step.

### 2.7 Extended Example

In the next step security mechanisms and the system environment will be added to the model:
• Access to the Server is secured by using SSL. Only access by clients with valid certificates will be accepted.

• An access control server (ACS) located in the intranet will distribute these certificates.

• WIFI is used by the client to access the resources. The keys for WIFI encryption are included in the initial state of the system.

Therefore new abstract roles are defined and added to group Network:

Intranet Uses the basic mechanisms for network access. For roles which inherit Intranet instead of Network. The macros send, receive, ... use the state component Intranet instead of Network.

WIFI Provides mechanisms for network access for roles which inherit WIFI instead of Network. The macros send, receive, etc. use the state component Air instead of Network and the network traffic is encrypted using symmetric keys.

PKI Provides macros and abstract roles for checking certificates, and distribution of certificates.

SSL The abstract roles for usage of SSL are defined in this preamble (The SSL handshake is modeled very simplified).

The actual protocol specification with role declarations and transition patterns is included in the group Extended_Example in the project. This folder also contains the preamble Gateway.pre with the transition pattern for relaying data from Intranet to WIFI and vice versa, and the attacker models.

The new transition pattern for initial distribution of certificates by the access control server ACS is added to the specification of the application:

Listing 5: ACS Server

def_role ACS from Intranet, CA_Root
{ client_keys: net_elem_seq := (ACS, Client, 1111) };

def_trans_pattern ACS send_cert
(client, key_val)
('ACS', client, key_val) << ACS.client_keys,
send_cert(client, key_val);

The role ACS which inherits the role Intranet and CA_Root sends certificates to all clients whose keys are stored in the state component ACS.client_keys. The ACS is located in the intranet. The actual protocol specification has not been changed, except of changing the inheritance hierarchy:
The macro expansion for the transition pattern `Client.send.get_secret` looks quite different compared to the expansion of this pattern presented in listing 4:

Listing 6: Macro expansion

```python
def_trans_pattern Client send get_secret
(SSL_Client.send_key_1, SSL_Client.send_cert_1,
 WiFi_internal_relay_net_2, WiFi_internal_relay_key_2)
Client_state='start',
Client_state := 'wait',
SSL_Client.send_key_1 := sfilter_tag('Server',Client.ssl_keys),
if SSL_Client.send_key_1 ::= { 
    ('Server', ['get_secret']) >> Client_ssl_messages,
    SSL_Client.send_cert_1 ? Client_ssl_cert,
    WiFi_internal_relay_net_2,'sym',WiFi_internal_relay_key_2
    ? Client_wifi_keys,
    (Client,'Server',
     encrypt(WiFi_internal_relay_key_2,
             ['SSL_connect_request',SSL_Client.send_cert_1]))
    >> Air,
} else {
    WiFi_internal_relay_net_2,'sym',WiFi_internal_relay_key_2
    ? Client_wifi_keys,
    (Client,'Server',
     encrypt(WiFi_internal_relay_key_2,
             encrypt(SSL_Client.send_key_1,['get_secret'])))) >> Air
};
```

In the next step the attacker model for network sniffing is added in the same way as described in section 2.6. Since the state component `Network` is not used
in this model now for instance Air and Intranet could be observed. An attacker for sniffing the intranet is included in the project:

- In the project manager choose Options in the menu for Intranet.pre in group Network. Activate Split by choosing Yes.

- Activate compile for attacker_functions.pre in group Standard_Preambles (left mouse click) and Attacker_sniff_Intranet.pre in group Extended_Example.

- Execute the command Analysis in the context menu of Extended_Example.pre.

- Choose Set Break in the Analysis window (in the menu on the right side). The same break condition can be used, because only the security requirements stored in the state component Goals are checked. The break condition is independent from the attacker type.

- Start the computation of the reachability graph by clicking Start Exhaustive Analysis in the command pane on the right side.

Also in this case a break occurs. State M-21 is displayed. The secret value 'secret' is stored unencrypted in the state component Attacker_State, which is used to store the knowledge of the attacker. The secret is computed by the transition Attacker_read from the value of Intranet_send:

$$(\text{Server,Client},[\text{encrypt},((\text{Client,Server}),\text{sym},8888),[\text{data,secret}])]$$

To decode the encrypted message the attacker must have the knowledge of the symmetric key $((\text{Client,Server}),\text{sym},8888)$ used by client and server. The transition where the attacker acquires this knowledge can be found using the search function of SHVT:

- Determine on path from the initial state to state M-21, where the break condition is fullfilled. (Command: Compute one Way to Root in the context menu of the state).

- Search the state where the knowledge of the symmetric key was acquired using the predicate

  $$\text{attack}('\text{Server}', 'conf', ((\text{Client}', 'Server'), 'sym', 8888)),$$
  $$('\text{Client}', 'conf', ((\text{Client}', 'Server'), 'sym', 8888)),$$
  $$\text{Attacker State,Global} = \text{true}$$

  using the command Search in the context menu of the path from the initial state.

A subpath where the key is computed in the last transition of the path is computed. The last search predicate looks similar to the predicate used in the break condition:
attack(Goals,Attacker_State,Global)='true';

Goals is replaced by

('Server','conf',(('Client','Server'),'sym',8888)).
('Client','conf',(('Client','Server'),'sym',8888))

In the case of the break condition Goals had the value: (Server,conf,[secret]), which did state that secret has to be treated confidential. Only the server should know secret. The client did not yet receive secret, therefore the corresponding value is not stored in Goals at this time. The constant which replaces Goals does express that the used symmetric key has to be treated confidentially and only client and server should know the key. States where this condition is violated are searched in our path. The result of the search query is a path where this condition is violated in the last state. In the predecessor state of this last state Intranet_send has the value:

<(Server,Client,
  [SSL_connect_response,
   [sign,(CA_Identity,priv,2222),(Server,pub,2222)],
   [crypt,(Client,pub,1111),((Client,Server),sym,8888)]])>

The symmetric key is encrypted, but the attacker seems to be able to decrypt this part of the message.
The next step where the attacker gets the knowledge to do the decryption can be found in the same way.